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IF THERE’S A WILL, THERE’S A WAY: THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S SIDESTEP OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
By
Ryan Cummins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the California
Supreme Court held in Sonic-Calabasas A., Inc. v Moreno (“Sonic II”) that an arbitration
agreement containing the waiver of a Berman1 hearing in an adhesive employment
contract signed as a condition of employment was not per se unconscionable.2 However,
the court narrowed the ruling of AT&T Mobility and held that unconscionability was still
a relevant defense to the enforcement of arbitration clauses.3 To do this, the court
distinguished generally applicable state laws that did not undermine fundamental
attributes of arbitration and those that did, and found that adhesive arbitration agreements
that required the waiver of a Berman hearing had to provide for an available, reasonable
determination of wage disputes.4 The holding leaves adhesive arbitration agreements in
employment contracts open to inquiries by the courts as to their enforceability in contexts
outside Berman hearing waivers. Practitioners in California would be wise to tailor their
adhesive employment arbitration agreements to align with the procedures provided in
Berman hearings as closely as possible, lest the agreements be found unconscionable.
While this case initially seems like acquiescence by the California Supreme Court to the
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1

The following is a summary of a Berman hearing:
“The Berman hearing procedure is designed to provide a speedy, informal, and
affordable method of resolving wage claims. In brief, in a Berman proceeding
the commissioner may hold a hearing on the wage claim; the pleadings are
limited to a complaint and an answer; the answer may set forth the evidence that
the defendant intends to rely on, and there is no discovery process; if the
defendant fails to appear or answer no default is taken and the commissioner
proceeds to decide the claim, but may grant a new hearing on request. The
commissioner must decide the claim within 15 days after the hearing. Within 10
days after notice of the decision any party may appeal to the appropriate court,
where the claim will be heard de novo; if no appeal is taken, the commissioner's
decision will be deemed a judgment, final immediately and enforceable as a
judgment in a civil action.”

Cuadra v Millan, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1998).
2

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 188 (Cal. 2013) [hereinafter Sonic II].

3

Id. at 188.

4

Id.
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United States Supreme Court’s ruling in AT&T Mobility v Concepcion,5 the California
Supreme Court again refused to accept defeat with regards to unconscionability.
II.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Frank Moreno, an employee of Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. (“Sonic”), was required
to sign, as a condition of his employment, among other things, an agreement6 to arbitrate
employment disputes.7 In December 2006, Mr. Moreno left his job with Sonic and began
the first step in obtaining a Berman hearing by filing an administrative wage claim in
California with the Labor Commissioner, claiming he was owed unpaid vacation wages.8
In February 2007, arguing that Mr. Moreno had waived his right to a Berman
hearing in the arbitration agreement, Sonic “petitioned the superior court to compel
arbitration of the wage claim and to dismiss the pending [Berman hearing].”9 The
Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that arbitration could not be compelled until
5

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).

6

Id. at 188-89. The important aspects of the arbitration agreement are copied below.
“The agreement also contained a paragraph governing dispute resolution, which
required both parties to submit employment disputes to “binding arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act, in conformity with the procedures of the
California Arbitration Act (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1280 et seq…).” The
arbitration provision applied to “all disputes that may arise out of the
employment context … that either [party] may have against the other which
would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental
dispute resolution forum[,]… whether based on tort, contract, statutory, or
equitable law, or otherwise.” The provision specified that it did not apply to
claims brought under the National Labor Relations Act or the California
Workers’ Compensation Act, or to claims before the Employment Development
Department. The provision further stated that the employee was not prevented
from “filing and pursuing administrative proceedings only before the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing or the U.S. Equal Opportunity
Commission.” In addition, the agreement provided that arbitration is to be
conducted by a “retired California Superior Court Judge” and that “to the extent
applicable in civil actions in California courts, the following shall apply and be
observed: all rules of pleading (including the right of demurrer), all rules of
evidence, all rights to resolution of the dispute by means of motions for
summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and judgment under Code of
Civil Procedure section 631.8.” At the request of either party, an arbitration
award may be reviewed by a second arbitrator who will, ‘as far as practicable,
proceed according to the law and procedures applicable to appellate review by
the California Court of Appeal of a civil judgment following court trial.’”

7

Id. at 188.

8

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 188. Moreno claimed he was owed sixty-three days of unpaid vacation wages,
totaling $441.29 per day.
9

Id.
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after a hearing and decision by the Labor Commissioner.10 The Court of Appeals held
that the arbitration agreement was a proper waiver of a Berman hearing and that it was
not against public policy.11
The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeals and held in
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc., v Moreno (“Sonic I”) that the waiver of a Berman hearing in a
pre-dispute adhesive arbitration was against public policy12 and unconscionable.13 The
Court held that such a waiver was against public policy because the protections given by
the Berman hearing were public and could not be waived by a private contract.14 The
Court also held that such a waiver was unconscionable because, as an adhesive contract,
it was predicated upon acceptance in order to gain employment, making it procedurally
unconscionable.15 Further, the Court held the waiver only favored the employer, making
it substantively unconscionable.16 The Court, however, did not invalidate the arbitration
agreement; instead, it simply severed the Berman waiver. After the Berman hearing
concluded, the parties were free to arbitrate.17 The Court found that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”)18 did not preempt this holding because the state law rule against
a Berman hearing waiver did not discriminate against arbitration agreements generally;
the rule applied to non-arbitration contracts also.19
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Sonic I, and in light
of the holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,20 vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for reconsideration to the California Supreme Court. 21 The Supreme
Court held in AT&T Mobility that a class action waiver within a consumer arbitration
agreement was not unconscionable.22 The Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a
10

Id. at 188-89.

11

Id.

12

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 51 Cal.4th 659, 684 (Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Sonic I].

13

Id. at 686.

14

Id. at 679.

15

Id. at 686.

16

Id.

17

Sonic I, 51 Cal.4th at 676.

18

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013).

19

Id. at 689.

20

AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1740.

21

Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S.Ct. 496 (2011).

22

AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1753.
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California state law that made class action waivers unconscionable because it went
against the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitration.23 The holding in the current
case represents the California Supreme Court’s reconsideration of the issue in light of
AT&T Mobility, on remand from the Supreme Court.
III.

COURT REASONING
A. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion

In Sonic II, the California Supreme Court overruled their holding in Sonic I and
held that the FAA, as interpreted in AT&T Mobility, preempted their Sonic I ruling that
waiver of a Berman hearing was per se unconscionable.24 To understand this fully, it is
important to summarize the holding in AT&T Mobility briefly, as applicable to this case.
In AT&T Mobility, the Concepcions agreed to an adhesive arbitration agreement, which
contained a class action waiver, with AT&T.25 They later had a dispute with AT&T and
attempted to bring a class action suit against AT&T.26 Lower courts relied on the
Discover Bank rule27 to invalidate the class action waiver contained in the arbitration
agreement.28 The Supreme Court held that “courts cannot impose unconscionability rules
that interfere with arbitral efficiency, including rules forbidding waiver of administrative
procedures that delay arbitration.”29 The Court held that “[w]hen state law prohibits
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”30 Stated more broadly, the Supreme Court
held that per se rules of unconscionability are preempted by the FAA. 31 The FAA

23

Id.

24

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 198.

25

AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1744.

26

Id.

27

See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 87 (Cal. 2005). In Discover Bank, the
California Supreme Court held that consumer arbitration class action waivers are unconscionable if the
arbitration agreement is adhesive in nature, the weaker party alleges the stronger party is intentionally
trying to defraud the weaker party, and disputes are likely to be small dollar amounts.
28

A&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1745.

29

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 199 (summarizing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1749).

30

AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1747.

31

Id.
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preempts a state’s rule that is “inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for
unrelated reasons.”32
B. The California Supreme Court’s Application of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
on Remand
The California Supreme Court, prompted by the holding in AT&T Mobility, found
that a per se rule prohibiting waiver of Berman hearings was preempted by the FAA:
“[b]ecause a Berman hearing causes arbitration to be substantially delayed, the
unwaivability of such a hearing, even if desirable as a matter of contractual fairness or
public policy, interferes with a fundamental attribute of arbitration—namely, its objective
to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”33 The Court held that
requiring a Berman hearing before commencement of arbitration would go against one of
the fundamental attributes of arbitration: to achieve quick results.34
Although the FAA preempted California’s law categorically prohibiting waiver of
a Berman hearing,35 the California Supreme Court found that unconscionability was still
a viable defense after AT&T Mobility.36 According to the Court, the ruling in AT&T
Mobility let stand the savings clause in FAA Section 2. The savings clause states
arbitration agreements are to be unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”37 These grounds include “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”38
The Court then narrowed the holding of AT&T Mobility, stating that it only
limited unconscionability; the holding did not abolish it as an available defense.39 The
Court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reasoning that some state-law rules are
preempted by the FAA not only if they discriminate against arbitration on their face, but,
when facially neutral state-laws are applied, they interfere with fundamental attributes of
arbitration.40 However, the court used this idea to justify the idea that “state-law rules
that do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration do not implicate

32

Id.

33

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 200.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 201.

37

9 U.S.C. § 2.

38

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746).

39

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201.

40

Id. at 203.
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Concepcion’s limits on state unconscionability rules.”41 The Court’s argument was that
unconscionability does not always interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration,
and if it does not, it would be allowed.42
The Court used this reasoning to find that a Berman hearing waiver could still be
unconscionable.43 The Court stated that “[w]aiver of [Berman hearing] protections does
not necessarily render an arbitration agreement unenforceable…but waiver of these
protections in the context of an agreement that does not provide an employee with an
accessible and affordable arbitral forum for resolving wage disputes may support a
finding of unconscionability.”44 The rule set by the Court “simply requires an adhesive
arbitration agreement that compels the surrender of Berman protections as a condition of
employment to provide for accessible, affordable resolution of wage disputes.”45 The
rule set forth by the Court was a state-law rule that did not undermine fundamental
attributes of arbitration, allowing it to survive the holding of AT&T Mobility.46
C. How Courts are to Determine Unconscionability
The California Supreme Court explained that courts must look to the terms of the
agreement and the process in practice to determine unconscionability.47 If, on the whole,
the arbitration agreement provided for an affordable, effective means of resolving wage
disputes, the agreement would not be found unconscionable.48 If the agreement made it
difficult or expensive for an employee to resolve a wage dispute, then the agreement
would be found unconscionable.49 The Court noted that there were some things that went
against the arbitration agreement in the current case, such as the trial like process the
arbitration agreement created: the arbitration was to be run by a retired California
Superior Court Judge, inclusion of discovery, depositions, application of the rules of
evidence, and review of the arbitration award.50 While the arbitration agreement did
41

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 201 (citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1748).

42

Id. at 203.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 206.

46

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 206.

47

Id. at 203.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.
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contain these features that were not tailored toward quick and affordable resolution of
wage claims, the Court found it necessary for courts to look to the arbitral institution
rules agreed to and the actual process undertaken to determine if those features promoted
fundamental attributes of arbitration.51 The Court acknowledged that there was no one
way to administer a wage dispute, and that arbitration could achieve the goals of a
Berman hearing.52 The Court also found that the way the contract was formed would be
important to the unconscionability question, such as whether the Berman waiver was
freely negotiated by a party with similar bargaining power.53
In the end, the Court laid out guidance for lower courts to determine
unconscionability in an adhesive employment contract that contained a Berman waiver,
but did not resolve the inquiry in the current case.54 It remanded this to the lower court to
determine, given the totality of the circumstances set out in the opinion, whether the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.55
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

Sonic II is significant because it is an acceptance, albeit mandatory, by the
California Supreme Court of the holding in AT&T Mobility. It does, however, contain an
important caveat. The California Supreme Court accepted that their previous ruling, that
Berman hearing waiver was per se unconscionable, was untenable, but they nevertheless
went to great lengths to narrow the holding in AT&T Mobility. The California Supreme
Court refused to give into the Supreme Court, and the holding in Sonic II could bring a
challenge by that judicial body. This holding once again shows the California judiciary’s
hostility to arbitration.56
While this case only dealt with the waiver of a Berman hearing, a broad reading
of the holding, that state-law rules that do not undermine fundamental attributes of
arbitration are acceptable, could open Pandora’s box. This holding potentially allows
disaffected parties to bring unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements that
waive other state-law rules that promote speed and affordability. Parties who want to
51

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 204.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 204-05.

54

Id. at 205.

55

Id. at 203.

56

See McLaughlin on Class Actions §2.14. Limitations on applicability of class action device – Class
certification in arbitration – Enforceability of consumer contract provisions barring class actions. Courts
applying California law were conspicuously hostile to "no class action" clauses in arbitration agreements,
reasoning that in actions involving small sums such clauses can be exculpatory in practice. See also Alan
S. Kaplinsky, Business Lawyer, Arbitration Developments: Concepcion – The Supreme Court Decisively
Steps In. In the wake of Conception, both state and federal courts have enforced arbitration agreements
containing class action waivers, even in states previously hostile to arbitration such as California.
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delay arbitration would be able to litigate such claims in court, which in the end would
neither promote speed nor affordability, as the litigation would take more time and more
money.
Practitioners who represent employers that impose adhesive arbitration
agreements on their employees as a condition of employment in California should pay
close attention to how this case is handled on remand and to any subsequent proceedings.
In the interim, practitioners should tailor their arbitration agreements to this ruling to
defeat any unconscionability suits. In Sonic I, the waiver of a Berman hearing was found
to be unconscionable, which if it had prevailed, would have meant that the parties would
have gone through a Berman hearing before they could arbitrate. Therefore, practitioners
should look to the California Supreme Court’s analysis on how to determine
unconscionability to avoid that outcome.
The Court’s analysis focused on a few key factors to determine unconscionability.
To avoid a court finding waiver of a Berman hearing as unconscionable based on one’s
arbitration agreement, practitioners should first and foremost provide for a forum that
promotes speed and affordability.57 While there is no one way to do this, as the Court
points out,58 practitioners would be wise to provide protections similar to Berman
hearings.59 This includes implementing a system to pay for attorney’s fees because
Berman hearings call for employers to pay their employees’ attorney’s fees on appeal if
the employee wins more than zero dollars.60 Practitioners could adopt this rule, which
would go towards promoting the affordability of the arbitration process. If a practitioner
is worried about excessive fees, the practitioner can give the arbitrator the power to
determine reasonable attorney’s fees. The employer should also agree to pay the
arbitrator costs and administrative fees, making access to resolution of a wage dispute
even more affordable. Practitioners must not be penny wise and pound foolish, as the
ability to avoid class arbitration still makes arbitration more valuable in the long run.
Practitioners might also look into promoting document-only arbitration with
regards to wage disputes. Document-only arbitration is a quick and affordable process in
which the parties submit documents and do not conduct oral hearings.61 Document-only
arbitration would allow for a quick and affordable disposition of the wage dispute. The
process is quick because parties need only send in documents supporting their position,

57

Sonic II, 311 P.3d at 203.

58

Id. at 204.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 191-92.

61

Document-only proceedings are offered by one of the more well-known arbitration institutions,
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Here is a link to a description of their documents only
proceeding.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:n46AFW97HNQJ:https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg%
3FIdcService%3DGET_FILE%26dDocName%3DADRSTG_009429%26RevisionSelectionMethod%3DL
atestReleased+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
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with no need for drawn out judicial processes, like discovery or cross-examination.62
Document-only arbitration is also affordable because the fees are smaller and it does not
necessarily require an attorney; if it does, the attorney’s involvement is muted compared
to the typical trial or arbitration proceedings, therefore their fees are lessened.63 If
practitioners can integrate document-only arbitration into their arbitration agreements, it
has the ability to not only save them from an unconscionability defense, but also to save
money and time.
The ruling in Sonic II creates jurisdictional variability. The holding sanctions a
case-by-case assessment of arbitration agreements. It has the potential to create a way
out of arbitration for disgruntled employees, and hope that they get a judge who will
liberally apply unconscionability review. One easy fix to this problem would be the
inclusion of a delegation of jurisdictional authority (Kaplan clause) within the arbitration
agreement. In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v Kaplan, the Supreme Court ruled that if
the parties agreed to submit jurisdictional issues to the arbitrator, then the arbitrator had
the authority to rule on them.64 This would give arbitrators the power to rule on the
arbitrability of the issues, such as unconscionability, themselves.65 The successful
insertion of a Kaplan clause into the arbitration agreement would take the analysis of the
court on the unconscionability of the waiver of a state-law rule out of the court’s hands
and place it in the hands of the arbitrator.66 This case theoretically could have been
avoided if there had been a Kaplan clause included in the arbitration agreement.
V.

CRITIQUE

The Court’s overruling of the holding in Sonic I was inevitable considering the
Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility, but the Court’s determination that
unconscionability remained viable is cause for concern within the arbitration community.
The biggest consequence of the holding is that the Court increased the ability of the
judiciary to supervise arbitration agreements. This increased judicial supervision can be
seen as a good or bad thing depending on the party. We will look at the ruling in Sonic II
from the perspective of both an employer and an employee.
The ruling in Sonic II is bad for employers who have Berman waivers within their
arbitration agreements because it creates uncertainty with regards to their arbitration
62

Id.

63

Id. The total cost of the AAA’s document-only proceeding is $1,300.

64

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941-42 (1995).

65

See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010).

66

Here is the successful delegation of jurisdictional authority from Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777:
“[t]he Arbitrator…shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to
the...enforceability...of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part
of this Agreement is void or voidable.”
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agreements. It is impossible for employers to know if the arbitration agreement they
draft today is going to be enforceable down the road. This uncertainty increases the costs
of arbitration. A court ruling that a Berman hearing waiver is unconscionable leads to
longer resolutions of wage disputes because parties need to go through a Berman hearing
before getting to arbitration. This makes arbitration less attractive to employers than it
previously would have been because it allows employees two bites at the apple. If the
employee does not get what they want from the Berman hearing, they have the recourse
to arbitration, drawing out the final resolution of the dispute in question. Because
employers will not know if their arbitration agreement is unconscionable, they cannot
effectively plan for future litigation costs. Instead of going to arbitration with their
disputes, the employer may have to endure litigation on the unconscionability of the
Berman hearing waiver, and if it is inadequate, proceed through a Berman hearing, then
potentially go to arbitration. The employer had hoped to go through one process,
arbitration; instead it potentially goes through three different judicial processes, all to
settle a wage claim.
On the other side of the equation is the employee. The Sonic II holding favors
employees because it tips the scales of the adhesive contract. The employer wrote the
arbitration agreement, and as a self-interested party, they will more likely than not tailor
it toward their needs and not an employees. The employer already has the ability to
impose terms favorable to themselves, such as class action waiver; the court is just giving
the employee some protection. States argue that they should be able to regulate this,
within their police powers, as a way to protect employees and grant them basic
protections. By ruling that state-law rules can pass unconscionability muster as long as
they do not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration, allows states to regulate
arbitration without being preempted. This holding forces employers to write arbitration
agreements in a way that is less one-sided. Agreements will need to be written in a way
that lines up with the expectations of the employee: that if wronged, the employee will
have state sanctioned recourse available.
The holding in Sonic II runs contrary to the emphatic federal policy favoring
arbitration. While those wishing to compel arbitration do not normally need to prove to
the court that the arbitration agreed to is equal to the recourse to litigation, they are forced
to prove that arbitration is just as quick and affordable as a Berman hearing. The holding
in Sonic II allows courts to postpone arbitration agreements in favor of state-law rules. It
also runs counter to the idea of freedom of contract. The parties agreed to waiver of
Berman hearings and the Court has decided it knows better than the parties and will not
allow it. The Court points to unconscionability as the reason, but the Court’s analysis is
not whether the arbitration proceeding itself is unconscionable, but whether the
arbitration process is comparable to a Berman hearing. This is classic judicial hostility to
arbitration. If a contract had provided for a Berman hearing waiver, and provided for the
parties to go to court, the California Supreme Court would not have called that agreement
unconscionable. However, because arbitration is involved, an employer has to prove that
his process is up to the courts’ liking. This is the type of judicial hostility the Supreme
Court has fought against, and which they ultimately might take up in the future.
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